In In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., the Second Circuit confirmed that, at the class-certification stage in a securities-fraud class action, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion to rebut the presumption of reliance under Basic v. Levinson by a preponderance of the evidence. The decision follows on the heels of a separate Second Circuit panel’s similar decision in Waggoner v. Barclays PLC and clarifies that a defendant need not provide “conclusive evidence” to rebut the presumption. Goldman Sachs is one of several federal court decisions interpreting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), which declined to dispense with the Basic presumption of reliance – which is premised on the “fraud-on-the-market” theory – but held that the presumption can be rebutted by “any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price.” Since Halliburton II was handed down, courts have wrestled with the proof a defendant must offer to rebut the presumption. In Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, issued in November 2017, the Second Circuit resolved the question by holding that a defendant bears the burden of...
Author: Jason R. Halpin
The Supreme Court has given a boost to companies defending against securities claims, ruling in California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities that a statute of repose cannot be extended by the doctrine that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for the claims of absent class members. The case emanated from a prior class action that had alleged, in connection with certain offerings by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, which relates to misrepresentations and omissions made in a securities registration statement. Section 13 of the Act provides that any such claim must be brought within “three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public.” CalPERS, which was an absent class member in the original class action, filed its own class action complaint more than three years after the transactions at issue and then opted out of the original class action. Affirming the decisions of the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the three-year limit in Section 13 is a statute of repose, and that such a limit cannot be extended by any court-made tolling doctrine....
Third Circuit Holds That Absent Class Members Need Not Show Standing and Reiterates Comcast’s Reiteration of Basic Rule 23 Principles
In a precedential opinion in Neale v. Volvo Cars of North America, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that putative class members need not establish Article III standing, and emphasized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) “was not breaking any new ground” because “the predominance analysis was specific to the antitrust claim at issue.”
Claims based on a retailer’s improper inclusion of too many credit card digits or a credit card expiration date on a sales receipt may not be brought under either the New Jersey Fair Credit Report Act (“NJFCRA”) or New Jersey’s Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”), according to a recent ruling by the New Jersey Law Division.
As recently reported by this blog, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld and clarified the implied requirement of Rule 23 that a class be ascertainable in order to be certified. But a New Jersey appellate court recently ruled that there is no such requirement under the New Jersey Court Rules, at least where each class member holds a low-value claim.
The Supreme Court has raised the class certification stakes yet again, holding in Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund that defendants in securities class actions may rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance at the class certification stage. Over the objections of Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito, the Court declined to toss out the presumption altogether.
Class Action Defendants Seeking to Eliminate Removal Uncertainty Get Assistance from Seventh Circuit Decision
In an opinion beneficial to class action defendants, the Seventh Circuit has taken some of the guesswork out of removal by holding that the 30-day period for removing a case to federal court only begins once the defendant has received a pleading or other litigation paper that includes a specific, unequivocal statement that the damages sought meet the jurisdictional amount.
Following the rule announced in Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, the Ninth Circuit has reversed course on the burden borne by defendants seeking to remove under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Now, defendants need only establish the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. In Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Services, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a putative class representative’s waiver of all damages above $5 million. The waiver was designed to avoid removal under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), but earlier this year, the Supreme Court held in Standard Fire that such waivers are ineffective. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s order remanding the case to state court and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
In a decision that expands the ability of plaintiffs to bring class actions in Delaware, the Delaware Supreme Court in Dow Chemical Corp. & Dole Food Company, Inc. v. Blanco adopted so-called cross-jurisdictional tolling, holding that the statute of limitations as to the claims of individual members of a putative class is tolled while a putative class action on their behalf is pending, regardless of “whether the class action is brought in Delaware or in a foreign court.”