Category: Class Action Defense

Third Circuit Affirms Narrow Definition of Autodialer Under the TCPA

Third Circuit Affirms Narrow Definition of Autodialer Under the TCPA

In a precedential decision, the Third Circuit affirmed a narrow reading of autodialer under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), the first such decision within this Circuit following the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the FCC’s 2015 definition of autodialer in ACA International. In Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., plaintiff purchased a cell phone with a reassigned telephone number, the prior owner of which had subscribed to Yahoo’s Email SMS Service. Because the prior owner of the number never cancelled the subscription, plaintiff received a text message from Yahoo every time the prior owner received an email, which amounted to thousands of text messages. Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that Yahoo had violated the TCPA, which requires that plaintiff prove that Yahoo’s Email SMS Service was an “automatic telephone dialing system,” i.e., an autodialer. Following the FCC’s 2015 ruling, plaintiff amended his complaint to allege that the Email SMS Service “ha[d] the potential capacity to place autodialed calls.” Yahoo moved for summary judgment, and both parties submitted expert reports addressing the Email SMS Service’s latent or potential capacity. The District Court granted Yahoo’s motion to exclude plaintiff’s expert reports and granted summary judgment in favor of Yahoo. On appeal, the...

Supreme Court Limits American Pipe Tolling, Holds Tolling Does Not Apply to Successive Class Actions

Supreme Court Limits American Pipe Tolling, Holds Tolling Does Not Apply to Successive Class Actions

The Supreme Court has acted to ensure that the class action device cannot be used to indefinitely extend the statute of limitations, holding in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh that American Pipe tolling does not apply to successive class actions. American Pipe tolling dates to 1974, when the Supreme Court held that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for absent class members who seek to intervene after the court has denied class certification. Nine years later, in Crown, Cork & Seal, the Supreme Court extended the rule to toll the statute of limitations for absent class members who choose to file their own individual actions. Resolving a split amongst the Circuits, the Supreme Court held that American Pipe tolling does not apply where class certification is denied and a class member subsequently seeks to bring a new class action after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Court opined that the “efficiency and economy of litigation” that underpin the American Pipe rule do not support tolling for successive class actions. Rather, the Court determined, barring tolling in such situations will promote efficiency by requiring all litigants who wish to act as class representatives to come...

Third Circuit Affirms the Dismissal of a Putative Class Action against TD Bank for Failure to Meet Pleading Requirements

Third Circuit Affirms the Dismissal of a Putative Class Action against TD Bank for Failure to Meet Pleading Requirements

Last month, the Third Circuit upheld the dismissal of a putative class action against TD Bank, finding that plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations lacked sufficient evidence and failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard for claims that sound in fraud. In MZL Capital Holdings, Inc. et al. v. TD Bank, N.A. et al., two account holders with TD Bank filed a proposed class action accusing the Bank of obscuring its exchange rates and improperly charging an embedded fee for converting foreign currency, thereby defrauding its customers in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of numerous other state consumer-protection laws. TD Bank moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim, and the District Court granted TD Bank’s motion, dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that plaintiffs’ claims were inadequately pled. At the outset, the Court re-affirmed the basic principle that claims brought under the Consumer Fraud Act sound in fraud and therefore must comply with Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. The Third...

New Jersey Appellate Court Upholds Class Waiver & Arbitration Provision

New Jersey Appellate Court Upholds Class Waiver & Arbitration Provision

The New Jersey Supreme Court has noted that both “federal and state policies favor[] arbitration.” Nevertheless, the High Court’s Atalese v. Legal Servs. Grp. decision—rejecting the enforceability of an arbitration clause—continues to raise questions about whether New Jersey state courts view such provisions with more skepticism than other jurisdictions. In this regard, the Appellate Division’s recent decision in Signor v. GWC Warranty Corp. provides some welcome guidance. In Signor, the trial court refused to dismiss and compel arbitration of class claims grounded in a particular automobile service contract. The contract contained an arbitration provision with language including: ARBITRATION PROVISION: READ THE FOLLOWING ARBITRATION PROVISION (“Provision”) CAREFULLY, IT LIMITS CERTAIN RIGHTS, INCLUDING YOUR RIGHT TO OBTAIN RELIEF OR DAMAGES THROUGH COURT ACTION. Any and all claims, disputes, or controversies of any nature whatsoever . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration before a single arbitrator. You agree that any arbitration proceeding will only consider Your Claims. Claims by, or on behalf of, other individuals will not be arbitrated in any proceeding that is considering Your Claims. You and We understand and agree that because of this Provision neither You nor Us will have the right to go to court except as provided...

Third Circuit Holds Agreement to Arbitrate in Illusory Forum Is Unenforceable

Third Circuit Holds Agreement to Arbitrate in Illusory Forum Is Unenforceable

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, in a precedential decision, that when parties enter an agreement directing them to arbitrate in an illusory forum, the forum selection clause is not severable and the entire agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable. In MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc. et al., a plaintiff brought suit on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleging a loan agreement between the parties was unconscionable and usurious. The agreement at issue included “(1) a provision requiring that all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by a representative of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (‘CRST’) and (2) a clause that delegates questions about the arbitration provision’s enforceability to the arbitrator.” The defendants moved to compel arbitration. The district court declined to compel arbitration because the agreement at issue expressly disavowed federal and state law, thus rendering the arbitration provisions invalid as an impermissible prospective waiver of federal and state statutory rights. The district court further held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the forum was illusory, as the selected forum did not conduct arbitrations or have rules for conducting arbitrations. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the loan agreement’s arbitration provision cannot direct...

In Defective Shingles Class Action, Third Circuit Rejects Novel “Expected Useful Life” Defect Theory Premised on Warranty Period

In Defective Shingles Class Action, Third Circuit Rejects Novel “Expected Useful Life” Defect Theory Premised on Warranty Period

The Third Circuit recently confirmed that plaintiffs must provide evidence of a specific defect, capable of classwide proof, in order to prevail on proposed class claims, holding that, where defective design is “an essential element of Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation-based claims,” whether proof of the defect “is susceptible to classwide evidence is dispositive of whether Plaintiffs can satisfy predominance” under Rule 23(b)(3). In Gonzalez v. Owens Corning, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of Oakridge fiberglass roofing shingles, claiming that their shingles, which were subject to warranties of 25 years or more, were “plagued by design flaws that result in cracking, curling and degranulation” and “will eventually fail.” The plaintiffs argued that the product warranties amounted to representations about the shingles’ expected useful life. Plaintiffs did not dispute that the design specifications for all shingles met the applicable industry design standard (“ASTM”), but claimed that compliance with the ASTM specifications did not consistently yield shingles that would last the stated warranty period. Thus, plaintiffs claimed that the issue of “defectiveness should be judged by the expected useful life of the shingles as represented by the applicable warranty period.” The plaintiffs’ expert, whose testimony was largely stricken as unreliable under Daubert, acknowledged that there...

New Jersey Supreme Court’s “Aggrieved Consumer” Ruling Will Erode TCCWNA Class Actions

New Jersey Supreme Court’s “Aggrieved Consumer” Ruling Will Erode TCCWNA Class Actions

The New Jersey Supreme Court’s April 16, 2018 decision in Spade v. Select Comfort (consolidated with Wenger v. Bob’s Discount Furniture, LLC), entirely destroys the viability of “no injury” class actions under the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”) and will also surely erode the viability of TCCWNA class certification more broadly. Via referred questions from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the N.J. Supreme Court held that in order to be an “aggrieved consumer” under the TCCWNA, a plaintiff must demonstrate an adverse consequence caused by an unlawful provision in a consumer contract or other writing. The TCCWNA essentially prohibits businesses from including in any written consumer contract, warranty, or sign any provision that “violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller” or other business. N.J.S.A. § 56:12-15. Although the TCCWNA on its face appears to only allow an “aggrieved consumer” to sue to recover a “civil penalty” of not less than $100 or actual damages, this Statute has been used—some might say abused—with increasing frequency by the plaintiff class action bar to bring “no injury” class actions premised solely upon the existence of a contract containing some unenforceable or...

TCPA Update: When Revocation of Consent Is Unreasonable

TCPA Update: When Revocation of Consent Is Unreasonable

The District of New Jersey recently made clear that when attempting to cancel unwanted commercial text messages, if the recipient does not follow the sender’s simple instructions, any other attempts to revoke consent to the text messages may be found unreasonable. In Rando v. Edible Arrangements International, LLC, a class action lawsuit claiming violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., plaintiff claimed that she was sent commercial text messages from defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). Though plaintiff had originally consented to receive such text messages, and never followed defendant’s instruction to text “STOP to cancel,” the complaint alleged that plaintiff had revoked her consent to receive the messages via other return text messages of varying content and that defendant had impermissibly designated an exclusive means for the revocation of consent.” The Rando court held that the complaint failed to state a TCPA claim by failing to allege that the plaintiff’s chosen method of revoking consent was reasonable. Plaintiff had replied to the text with language which would clearly indicate to a human being that she wanted to revoke her consent, but she did not text back “STOP” as instructed in...

D.C. Circuit’s Rejection of FCC’s 2015 “Autodialer” Definition is Welcome News for Businesses in TCPA Class Actions

D.C. Circuit’s Rejection of FCC’s 2015 “Autodialer” Definition is Welcome News for Businesses in TCPA Class Actions

On March 16, 2018, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a long awaited decision in its review of the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order, which among other things, had sought to clarify various aspects of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s (TCPA) general bar against using automated dialing devices (ATDS) to make uninvited calls or texts messages. The FCC’s 2015 Order was largely viewed by businesses as having greatly expanded the scope of the TCPA, opening the floodgates of class action litigation against businesses utilizing virtually any type of text messaging to communicate ads to customers. In ACA International v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit, among other things, struck down the Commission’s broad definition of autodialer. The TCPA generally makes it unlawful to call a cell phone using an ATDS, i.e., “equipment which has the capacity-(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. § 227(a)(1). The FCC’s 2015 Order declined to define a device’s “capacity” in a manner confined to its “present capacity,” but rather, construed a device’s “capacity” to encompass its “potential functionalities” with modifications such as software changes. Thus,...

Plaintiffs No Longer Need a “Nexus” to Pennsylvania in Order to Bring Claims Under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

Plaintiffs No Longer Need a “Nexus” to Pennsylvania in Order to Bring Claims Under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

In answering a certified question from the Third Circuit, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently issued a decision that greatly expands the reach of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). In Danganan v. Guardian Protection Services, the Supreme Court held that “a non-Pennsylvania resident may bring suit under the UTPCPL against a [Pennsylvania]-headquartered business based on transactions that occurred out-of-state.” Plaintiff Danganan contracted with Guardian Protection Services (“Guardian”), a Pennsylvania-headquartered business, for home security equipment and services at the plaintiff’s then-home in Washington, DC. The contract contained, inter alia, a choice-of-law provision, stating that the “Agreement shall be governed by the laws of Pennsylvania.” After moving to California, the plaintiff attempted to cancel the agreement, but Guardian continued to bill the plaintiff, claiming the agreement authorized ongoing charges through the contract’s term, regardless of cancellation attempts. The plaintiff brought suit in Pennsylvania state court, and Guardian removed the matter to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Guardian then moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff had not, pursuant to the UTPCPL, demonstrated a “sufficient nexus” between Pennsylvania and the improper conduct alleged in the complaint. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint....