Tagged: Corporate Law

Delaware Supreme Court Orders Production of Emails in Response to Section 220 Demand and Refuses to Restrict Knock-On Litigation to Delaware

Delaware Supreme Court Orders Production of Emails in Response to Section 220 Demand and Refuses to Restrict Knock-On Litigation to Delaware

In KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Technologies Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court required a corporation to produce emails in response to a “books and records” demand under 8 Del. C. §220; it also refused to limit any knock-on litigation on the merits to the Delaware Court of Chancery. KT4 is a stockholder in Palantir and received certain rights under a series of Investor Rights Agreements and a First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement. After a falling out between KT4 and Palantir’s management, Palantir amended the Investor Rights Agreement in ways detrimental to KT4. KT4 responded with a request to inspect Palantir’s “books and records” pursuant to 8 Del. C. §220, which entitles a stockholder to inspect a corporation’s “books and records” if, and to the extent that, the requested inspection “is for a proper purpose.” Palantir refused to comply, and KT4 filed a §220 action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to compel production of the requested documents. The Court of Chancery ruled that KT4 had a statutory “proper purpose” of investigating three areas of potential corporate wrongdoing: 1) Palantir’s failure to hold stockholder meetings, 2) Palantir’s amendment of the Investor Rights Agreement, and 3) Palantir’s potential breach of the Investor...

Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Appraisal Rights for Stockholders Who Relinquish Control of their Corporation Through Merger Involving a Special Merger Subsidiary

Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Appraisal Rights for Stockholders Who Relinquish Control of their Corporation Through Merger Involving a Special Merger Subsidiary

Delaware law generally grants appraisal rights to shareholders of corporations involved in statutory mergers or consolidations. But, what are the rights of shareholders when control of their corporation is relinquished through a merger between a specially-created merger subsidiary and another corporation? According to Chancellor Bouchard’s recent opinion, the shareholders have no appraisal rights because they do not own shares in a “constituent corporation in the merger.” Chancellor Bouchard also found that the shareholders are not entitled to appraisal rights because they will retain their shares in the parent corporation in the contemplated transaction. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, and Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., a privately-held corporation, wanted to combine their businesses. They therefore agreed to a so-called reverse triangular merger, pursuant to which (1) Dr. Pepper will create a new subsidiary, (2) that subsidiary will be merged into Keurig’s owner, Maple Parent Holdings Corp., and (3) Maple Parent will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dr. Pepper. In addition, Maple Parent will pay a $9 billion dividend to Dr. Pepper and receive enough shares in Dr. Pepper to give it a controlling 87% share of Dr. Pepper’s common stock. Maple Parent’s $9 billion payment to Dr. Pepper will...

Access Denied: NJ Appellate Division Clarifies Shareholder’s Right to Inspection of Corporate Records

Access Denied: NJ Appellate Division Clarifies Shareholder’s Right to Inspection of Corporate Records

In R.A. Feuer v. Merck & Co., Inc., the New Jersey Appellate Division, in a to-be-published opinion, narrowly construed the scope of a shareholder’s right to inspect a corporation’s records under N.J.S.A. 14A:5-28 and the common law. A Merck & Co, Inc. shareholder appealed from the dismissal of his complaint seeking various corporate records, including twelve broad categories of documents. The shareholder sought evidence that Merck acted wrongfully in its acquisition of another pharmaceutical firm. After Merck appointed a working group to assess the shareholder’s concerns, the shareholder requested documents pertaining generally to the working group’s activities, communications, and formation; documents provided to the board regarding the target pharmaceutical firm and two of its drugs; and the board’s considerations of the shareholder’s demands and the working group’s recommendation. Merck disclosed pertinent minutes of the board and of the working group, but denied the remainder of the shareholder’s demand. The trial court determined that the shareholder’s demand exceeded the scope of the “books and records of account, minutes, and record of shareholders,” which the shareholder had a statutory right to inspect and that the common law did not expand that statutory right. The Appellate Division affirmed, narrowly construing the plain language...

NY Updates Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies 0

NY Updates Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies

On December 28, 2016, the New York Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) published an updated version of its proposed “Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies.” The updated regulations will become effective on March 1, 2017. As previously reported, these regulations are an important step in the ongoing national dialogue about reasonable and necessary cybersecurity standards for all businesses.

The Ties That Bind: When Will a Court Expel a Member of an LLC? 0

The Ties That Bind: When Will a Court Expel a Member of an LLC?

In IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed when a limited liability company (LLC) can expel a member under a statute authorizing a member’s disassociation for conduct that has made it “not reasonably practicable to carry on” the LLC’s activities. IE Test had three members, two of whom actively ran the business and drew salaries, and a third who played no role in the LLC’s day-to-day affairs. Before an operating agreement was executed, a dispute arose between the two active members and the passive member over the passive member’s compensation. Consequently, no operating agreement was ever signed. The two active members then sought to judicially disassociate the passive member on the statutory ground that the impasse and absence of an operating agreement made it “not reasonably practicable” that he could continue as a member. The trial court granted summary judgment, expelling the passive member, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

In “Spring-Loaded” Options Case, Court Finds Failure to Disclose Board’s “Unclean Heart” Does Not Violate Federal Securities Laws But Allows Common Law Fiduciary Duty Claims to Proceed Against Directors Approving Options 0

In “Spring-Loaded” Options Case, Court Finds Failure to Disclose Board’s “Unclean Heart” Does Not Violate Federal Securities Laws But Allows Common Law Fiduciary Duty Claims to Proceed Against Directors Approving Options

In a far-reaching opinion addressing a host of issues relating to the granting of so-called “spring-loaded” stock options to a corporation’s board of directors, the District of New Jersey dismissed a claim under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act because federal securities laws do not require the corporation to disclose in its proxy statement that the options were part of a “spring-loading” scheme. But the court allowed common-law breach of fiduciary duty claims to proceed against the directors who served on the board’s compensation committee under the entire-fairness doctrine.

Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies Reach of Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Directors and Officers of Delaware Corporations Under 10 Del. C. § 3114 0

Delaware Supreme Court Clarifies Reach of Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Directors and Officers of Delaware Corporations Under 10 Del. C. § 3114

The Delaware Supreme Court, in Marc Hazout v. Tsang Mun Ting, No. 353, 2015 (Feb. 26, 2016) (Strine, C.J.), held that the reach of personal jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. § 3114 over nonresident officers and directors of Delaware corporations, contrary to Court of Chancery precedent, is not limited to claims by stockholders against such officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, under the plain language of the statute, a nonresident officer or director of a Delaware corporation, by virtue of accepting and holding office, has consented to personal jurisdiction in Delaware, subject to the requirements of due process, in two classes of cases: (i) “all civil actions or proceedings brought in this State, by or on behalf of, or against such corporation, in which such officer [or director] is a necessary or proper party”; or (ii) “any action or proceeding against such officer [or director] in violation of a duty in such capacity.”

Delaware Supreme Court Says that Minority Stockholder Which Manages Company’s Day-to-Day Affairs is not a “Controlling Stockholder” and Confirms that Mandatory Stockholder Approval of Merger Transaction Compels Application of Business Judgment Rule 0

Delaware Supreme Court Says that Minority Stockholder Which Manages Company’s Day-to-Day Affairs is not a “Controlling Stockholder” and Confirms that Mandatory Stockholder Approval of Merger Transaction Compels Application of Business Judgment Rule

The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC makes two important points about corporate governance litigation. First, the court rejected the novel argument that an owner of less than 1% of a company’s stock could be considered a “controlling stockholder” because it managed the company’s day-to-day affairs under a management agreement. Second, the court confirmed that when a transaction has been approved by a majority of the company’s disinterested stockholders, the highly deferential business judgment rule should govern any challenges to the transaction, even if the stockholder vote was statutorily required and not voluntary.

Recent DGCL Sections Facilitate Ratification, Validation of Defective Corporate Acts; Minimal Reported Court Activity To Date But More Expected 0

Recent DGCL Sections Facilitate Ratification, Validation of Defective Corporate Acts; Minimal Reported Court Activity To Date But More Expected

It’s been more than a year since the Delaware General Corporation Law added sections 204 and 205, allowing boards of directors to ratify, or the Court of Chancery to validate, defective corporate acts, including the issuance of stock that did not fully comply with corporate formalities. The Delaware General Assembly’s unanimous adoption of sections 204 and 205 elevated substance over form by giving effect to corporate action that at all times was treated as validly authorized, even if the action was technically deficient.

Delaware Corporations May Enact Bylaws Requiring Litigation to be Venued in Delaware Courts 0

Delaware Corporations May Enact Bylaws Requiring Litigation to be Venued in Delaware Courts

On June 25, 2013, the Delaware Court of Chancery paved the way for the boards of directors of Delaware corporations to amend their bylaws to include forum selection clauses requiring any litigation related to the corporation’s internal affairs to be conducted in Delaware courts. Adopting such provisions is intended to avoid the inefficiency and cost of Delaware corporations having to defend against the same litigation in multiple forums (e.g., both in Delaware and the state of the corporation’s principal place of business, as well as in state and federal court).