In In Re: Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that buyer’s remorse, without more, does not constitute an economic injury sufficient to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff brought a putative class action against defendant Johnson & Johnson, alleging that perineal use of defendant’s baby powder by women could lead to an increased risk of ovarian cancer. Plaintiff did not allege that she had developed or was at an increased risk of developing ovarian cancer. Nor did she allege that the product was defective in performing the functions for which it was advertised. Furthermore, Plaintiff had used all the product and, thus, was not seeking reimbursement for a product she cannot use. Rather, Plaintiff alleged that she would not have bought the baby powder had she known that it could lead to an increased risk of cancer. The District Court of New Jersey dismissed her complaint for lack of Article III standing. The Third Circuit affirmed. It relied on its analyses in Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League and Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories to determine that Plaintiff’s allegations were too...
Tagged: Motion to Dismiss Granted
Ninth Circuit Adopts Expansive Definition of Autodialer Under the TCPA, Creating Circuit Split With Third Circuit
In Marks v. Crunch San Diego, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, considering anew the statutory definition of automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), held that an ATDS includes a device that stores telephone numbers to be called, “whether or not those numbers have been generated by a random or sequential number generator.” The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to follow the Third Circuit’s interpretation of ATDS in Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., thus setting up a clear Circuit split. Both Marks and Dominguez were issued after the D.C. Circuit invalidated the FCC’s interpretation of ATDS in ACA International v. Federal Communications Commission. In Marks, plaintiff brought a TCPA class action after receiving three text messages from Crunch Fitness where he had a gym membership, asserting that the texts were sent using an ATDS. The messaging system was a “web-based marketing platform designed to send promotional text messages to a list of stored telephone numbers.” Phone numbers were either manually entered into the system or provided directly by customers. To send text campaigns, a Crunch employee would log in, select the intended recipients, generate the content of a message, and select the time and date for...
New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Four Putative Class Actions Claiming Violations of Section 16 of the TCCWNA
In Duke v. All American Ford, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of four putative class actions (consolidated for appeal) alleging that agreements to purchase, lease, or rent motor vehicles violated the Truth in Consumer Contracts, Warranty, and Notice Act’s (TCCWNA) Section 16. The trial courts had dismissed all such claims for failure to plead a violation of Section 16. While the appeals in these matters were pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Spade v. Select Comfort, holding that “an adverse consequence is a necessary element of the TCCWNA cause of action.” As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Spade, the Appellate Division in Duke rejected the appeals and affirmed the orders of dismissal without even considering the various substantive Section 16 arguments. Each of the putative class action complaints alleged that certain clauses in purchase, lease, or rental documents violated Section 16 of the TCCWNA, which, among other things, prohibits language in a written contract “that any of its provisions is or may be void, unenforceable, or inapplicable in some jurisdictions without specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey.” Three of the cases (Duke,...
The District of New Jersey recently made clear that when attempting to cancel unwanted commercial text messages, if the recipient does not follow the sender’s simple instructions, any other attempts to revoke consent to the text messages may be found unreasonable. In Rando v. Edible Arrangements International, LLC, a class action lawsuit claiming violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., plaintiff claimed that she was sent commercial text messages from defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). Though plaintiff had originally consented to receive such text messages, and never followed defendant’s instruction to text “STOP to cancel,” the complaint alleged that plaintiff had revoked her consent to receive the messages via other return text messages of varying content and that defendant had impermissibly designated an exclusive means for the revocation of consent.” The Rando court held that the complaint failed to state a TCPA claim by failing to allege that the plaintiff’s chosen method of revoking consent was reasonable. Plaintiff had replied to the text with language which would clearly indicate to a human being that she wanted to revoke her consent, but she did not text back “STOP” as instructed in...
California District Court Dismisses Facebook’s TCCWNA “Website Terms and Conditions” Lawsuit in Light of Valid Choice-of-Law Provision
New Jersey’s Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”) ushered in a wave of class actions last year, targeting various provisions in retailers’ websites “terms and conditions.” Broadly speaking, the TCCWNA prohibits “consumer contracts” from containing language that violates any “clearly established legal right[s].” New Jersey courts have not been alone in adjudicating these cases, however, as a number of similar lawsuits have been brought in other jurisdictions, including California federal district courts. For example, on September 7, 2016, the Central District of California dismissed the complaint in Candelario v. Rip Curl, Inc. on standing grounds, holding that because the plaintiff’s “only connection to the Terms and Conditions appears to be her decision to read them” and because her complaint essentially alleged only “bare procedural violation[s]” of the TCCWNA – without more – she could not satisfy “the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Even more recently, although on different grounds, the Northern District of California dismissed a “website terms and conditions” class action against Facebook. In Palomino v. Facebook, Inc., as in Candelario, the plaintiffs alleged that the social media company’s website terms and conditions violated the TCCWNA because of “provisions that purport to ‘1) disclaim liability for claims brought for...
New Jersey Federal Court Relies on Spokeo to Dismiss FACTA Class Action For Failure to Allege Concrete Harm
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey recently relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Spokeo v. Robins to grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss a statutory violation-based class action complaint for failure to allege a concrete injury. In Kamal v. J. Crew Group Inc., et al. the Court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”) because, as in Spokeo, the claims were based on a purely statutory injury, i.e., the plaintiff did not allege a “concrete and particularized” injury.
Notwithstanding a recent trend of seemingly anti-arbitration decisions in the state courts, a New Jersey District Court recently dismissed a consumer fraud complaint that it found to be duplicative of a prior arbitration award. In 2009, the plaintiff purchased a vehicle, and then leased an additional car from the same dealer in 2010. Despite signing agreements to arbitrate with the dealer, the plaintiff filed a complaint in state court against the dealer, Metro Honda, which was dismissed on the ground that the arbitration agreements were enforceable and required her to arbitrate her dispute. Plaintiff filed a demand for arbitration, citing a variety of consumer fraud statutes. An arbitration award was entered denying all of the plaintiff’s claims, and she neither appealed nor moved to vacate or modify the award.
Doomed CFA and TCCWNA Claims for Proposed Health Club Class Action Lead District Court to Question CAFA Jurisdiction
The District of New Jersey’s recent decision in Truglio v. Planet Fitness, Inc. provides valuable lessons on pleading claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”), and Health Club Services Act (“HCSA”). Not only does the district court’s opinion reinforce the requirement of an ascertainable loss to sustain a CFA claim, but it also confirms that omissions are not actionable under the TCCWNA. Moreover, the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff in this putative class action did not plead an ascertainable loss directly called into question the subject matter jurisdiction of the court: is there $5 million in controversy under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) if the plaintiff has not alleged an ascertainable loss? Read below for more on this case, and stay tuned for additional developments after supplemental briefing on the CAFA issue.
In the thick of a torrent of litigation, mostly class actions, premised upon purportedly unlawful contractual provisions under the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”) – a statute that permits “no-injury” claims – the District of New Jersey has reaffirmed a bright-line rule concerning this law: Omissions don’t trigger liability.
Super Bowl Tickets Not the Ticket to Federal Class Action, as Third Circuit Finds No Standing for Uninjured Plaintiffs
“[T]he disappointment of wanting to attend a concert or athletic event only to discover that the event has sold out,” does not confer constitutional standing. That was the take away from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recent precedential decision, Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League. Addressing the always-thorny contours of constitutional standing to bring a federal lawsuit, the Court held, in the face of high Super Bowl ticket prices, that neither non-purchasers of tickets nor purchasers of “scalped” tickets at elevated prices, had standing to sue under Article III. This opinion sets up yet another obvious roadblock in the path of plaintiffs looking to bring claims—whether or not as class actions—when their perceived injuries are either non-existent or so tenuous as to make “difficulties in alleging an injury-in-fact . . . insurmountable.”