Tagged: Standing

Third Circuit Rejects Buyer’s Remorse as a Cognizable Injury Under Article III

Third Circuit Rejects Buyer’s Remorse as a Cognizable Injury Under Article III

In In Re: Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that buyer’s remorse, without more, does not constitute an economic injury sufficient to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff brought a putative class action against defendant Johnson & Johnson, alleging that perineal use of defendant’s baby powder by women could lead to an increased risk of ovarian cancer. Plaintiff did not allege that she had developed or was at an increased risk of developing ovarian cancer. Nor did she allege that the product was defective in performing the functions for which it was advertised. Furthermore, Plaintiff had used all the product and, thus, was not seeking reimbursement for a product she cannot use. Rather, Plaintiff alleged that she would not have bought the baby powder had she known that it could lead to an increased risk of cancer. The District Court of New Jersey dismissed her complaint for lack of Article III standing. The Third Circuit affirmed. It relied on its analyses in Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League and Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories to determine that Plaintiff’s allegations were too...

Third Circuit Relies on Spokeo to Shed Light on What is Needed For Article III Injury-in-Fact Standing

Third Circuit Relies on Spokeo to Shed Light on What is Needed For Article III Injury-in-Fact Standing

In Long v. SEPTA, the Third Circuit considered whether and when a violation of a statute is a standing-conferring injury-in-fact satisfying the Constitution’s “case or controversy” requirement. At issue in Long was whether the plaintiffs, who were denied employment by SEPTA when background checks disclosed disqualifying criminal histories, could sue SEPTA for failing to provide them with copies of their rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and copies of their background consumer reports before being denied employment, both of which are required by FCRA. The district court dismissed the complaint, stating that the plaintiffs did not allege a “concrete injury in fact,” because the alleged FCRA violations were “bare procedural violations.” On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim based on SEPTA’s failure to provide the plaintiffs notice of their FCRA rights. The Court held that, because the plaintiffs understood their rights well enough to bring the suit, they were not injured by SEPTA’s failure to give them notice of those rights and, therefore, lacked standing to pursue the claim. But the Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claim based on SEPTA’s failure to provide copies of the plaintiffs’ consumer reports. The Third Circuit...

Wrap Up of United States Supreme Court’s 2016-17 Term

Wrap Up of United States Supreme Court’s 2016-17 Term

With the close of the United States Supreme Court’s 2016-17 term, we offer this wrap up of the term’s most important business and commercial cases (excluding patent cases): Kindred Nursing Ctrs, L.P. v. Clark: The Supreme Court continued its full-throated support of arbitration agreements, again rejecting a state supreme court’s effort to apply an ostensibly arbitration-neutral rule of law to invalidate an arbitration agreement. In Kindred, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement signed by an attorney-in-fact under a broad power of attorney was invalid because the power of attorney did not expressly give the attorney-in-fact the right to waive the principal’s right to a jury trial. According to the Kentucky Supreme Court, to grant an attorney-in-fact the authority to waive a “fundamental constitutional right,” a power of attorney must grant that authority expressly and unambiguously. Because the right to access the courts and the right to a jury trial are such “fundamental constitutional rights” and because the power of attorney did not expressly and unambiguously waive them, the attorney-in-fact was not authorized to agree to arbitrate the principal’s claims, and no enforceable arbitration agreement was created. The Supreme Court found that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s facially arbitration-neutral...

Supreme Court Rejects Class Action Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Circumvent Rule 23(f)

Supreme Court Rejects Class Action Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Circumvent Rule 23(f)

As previously discussed on this blog, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the named Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. In the June 12, 2017 decision in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, the high court answered this question with a very resounding “no.” In Baker, a putative class of owners of Microsoft Corporation’s Xbox 360® video game console filed suit, alleging that the console suffered from a design defect that gouged game discs. Microsoft opposed Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class. The District Court denied certification, citing comity considerations and relying on the class certification denial in a similar case. The Ninth Circuit denied the Plaintiffs’ 23(f) petition for interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the case with prejudice for the express purpose of obtaining immediate Ninth Circuit review of the District Court’s denial of class certification. Plaintiffs filed an appeal from the final judgment, challenging the denial of class certification, but not the order dismissing the case with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the stipulated dismissal did not involve a...

Supreme Court to Decide Whether Class Action Plaintiffs Can Ring Their Own “Death Knell” Bell

Supreme Court to Decide Whether Class Action Plaintiffs Can Ring Their Own “Death Knell” Bell

The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument last month on the issue of whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their individual claims with prejudice. The case comes to the Supreme Court from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Baker v. Microsoft Corp. In Baker, a putative class of owners of Microsoft Corporation’s (Microsoft) Xbox 360® video game console filed suit, alleging that the console suffered from a design defect that gouged game discs. Microsoft opposed Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class. The District Court denied certification, citing comity considerations and relying on the class certification denial in a similar case. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a 23(f) petition for interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Circuit, which was denied. The Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the case with prejudice, with the express purpose of obtaining immediate Ninth Circuit review of the District Court’s denial of class certification. Plaintiffs filed an appeal from the final judgment, challenging the denial of class certification. On appeal, Microsoft argued that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction because a voluntary dismissal with prejudice does not sufficiently affect the merits of the substantive claims to constitute...

Seventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Data Privacy Class Action on Article III Standing Grounds

Seventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Data Privacy Class Action on Article III Standing Grounds

Since the United States Supreme Court decided Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins in May 2016, lower courts have struggled to consistently determine whether a plaintiff has standing to sue in federal court, which, as the Spokeo court explained, “requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” That is, even when Congress has made something unlawful and authorized an award of statutory damages for the unlawful act, the mere violation of that law is not itself sufficient to confer standing to sue under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. But precisely what is required to demonstrate sufficient “injury” under Article III remains unclear after Spokeo, especially in the data-breach and data-privacy contexts. In Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., however, a unanimous Seventh Circuit decision, authored by Judge Posner, held that the defendant’s possible failure to comply with a requirement contained in the Cable Communications Policy Act (requiring the destruction of personally identifiable information (“PII”) if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected) did not afford the plaintiff Article III standing to sue for violation of the statute where his personal information was not released or disseminated in any way. The plaintiff...

New Jersey Federal Court Relies on Spokeo to Dismiss FACTA Class Action For Failure to Allege Concrete Harm 0

New Jersey Federal Court Relies on Spokeo to Dismiss FACTA Class Action For Failure to Allege Concrete Harm

The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey recently relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Spokeo v. Robins to grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss a statutory violation-based class action complaint for failure to allege a concrete injury. In Kamal v. J. Crew Group Inc., et al. the Court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”) because, as in Spokeo, the claims were based on a purely statutory injury, i.e., the plaintiff did not allege a “concrete and particularized” injury.

Eighth Circuit Relies on Spokeo to Hold That Retention of Personal Information, Without More, Does Not Satisfy Article III’s Injury-in-Fact Requirement 0

Eighth Circuit Relies on Spokeo to Hold That Retention of Personal Information, Without More, Does Not Satisfy Article III’s Injury-in-Fact Requirement

The United States Supreme Court decision in Spokeo v. Robins, in which the Court considered whether a claim of statutory damages was sufficient to confer Article III standing, left much to be desired in terms of guidance for lower courts and litigants. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit’s recent refusal to revive a putative class action over Charter Communications Inc.’s allegedly indefinite retention of consumer data illuminated a way for defendants to trim claims of bare statutory violations, while clarifying how Spokeo should be applied.

Data Breach Victims Grounded: Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Putative Class Action Based on Economic-Loss Doctrine and Absence of Explicit Contractual Obligations 0

Data Breach Victims Grounded: Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Putative Class Action Based on Economic-Loss Doctrine and Absence of Explicit Contractual Obligations

The Third Circuit’s recent decision affirming the district court’s dismissal of a proposed class action in its entirety highlights the difficulties faced by Plaintiffs pursuing data-security class actions in situations where the claims are not based upon explicit contractual language. This is an important decision for defense counsel to keep in mind in considering options to get rid of a class action before it takes off.

Supreme Court in Spokeo Holds Plaintiffs Must Allege More Than a Bare Procedural Violation to Stand Up for Their Rights 0

Supreme Court in Spokeo Holds Plaintiffs Must Allege More Than a Bare Procedural Violation to Stand Up for Their Rights

After much anticipation, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Spokeo v. Robins, a case that many believed would finally establish a definitive ruling as to whether a federal statute which awards statutory damages to those impacted is sufficient to confer Article III standing. The question is particularly relevant in the class action context where class members could be awarded statutory damages in the absence of any actual damages. Unfortunately, although the Court considered the scope of the injury-in-fact requirement, the 6-2 decision still leaves the standing question open to interpretation by courts and by both plaintiffs and defendants.